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Abstract. Human-human communication is critical to safe operations in do-
mains such as air transportation where airlines develop and train pilots on
communication procedures with the goal to ensure that they check that verbal
air traffic clearances are correctly heard and executed. Such communication pro-
tocols should be designed to be robust to miscommunication. However, they can
fail in ways unanticipated by designers. In this work, we present a method for
modeling human-human communication protocols using the Enhanced Operator
Function Model with Communications (EOFMC), a task analytic modeling for-
malism that can be interpreted by a model checker. We describe how miscommu-
nications can be generated from instantiated EOFMC models of human-human
communication protocols. Using an air transportation example, we show how
model checking can be used to evaluate if a given protocol will ensure successful
communication. Avenues of future research are explored.
Keywords: Task analysis, Human-human communication, Air traffic control,
Formal methods, Model checking, Human error.
1 Introduction
Human-human communication is critical to the safe operations of many complex sys-
tems. For example, until the Data Communication Integrated Services (DCIS) contract
is fully implemented [25], voice communications will continue to be the primary mech-
anism for air traffic control clearances in the United States [1]. In many work do-
mains, institutions develop human-human communication protocols to support safer
operations. In air transportation, for example, the pilot/controller communication loop,
using readbacks and other confirmation behaviors, is designed to support safety and re-
dundancy of pilot/controller communications [32]. However miscommunications con-
tinue to impact the safety of complex systems. The Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) data base, for example, identifies problems including incorrect communica-
tions, incomplete or absent communications, and correct but late communications [35].
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Further, Jones [32] has identified a number of air transportation accidents where mis-
communication played a significant role.
As miscommunications continue, institutions will try to enhance human-human com-
munication protocols. Thus having methods to verify such protocols can improve safety.
There is a long tradition of formal methods being used to describe and formally verify
machine communication protocols [2, 8, 19, 22, 38, 42] including the injection of com-
munication faults or errors into the models [21, 41]. While human-human communi-
cation protocols could be modeled using these traditional formal methods approaches,
human-human communication, which can include verbal statements, gestures, and re-
lated actions, is different from machine communication. Human communications are
actions [3] that occur as part of the participants’ larger tasks (i.e., goal directed norma-
tive behaviors to accomplish system goals [34]).
Few researchers have used formal methods to evaluate human-human communica-
tion protocols. Hörl and Aichernig [29, 30] developed a formal model of the system
pilots and air traffic controllers use to communicate. However, rather than perform for-
mal verification, they used automated test case generation to develop scenarios to guide
human subject testing. Thus, Hörl and Aichernig avoided having to explicitly model
and evaluate protocols with a task by having the actual tests provide that context. Oth-
ers have investigated how task analytic models can be incorporated into formal models
and evaluated with formal verification (see [17] for a review). Only Paternò et al. [37]
and Bass et al. [4] treat human-human communication as actions [4] within a larger
set of coordinated communication and task relevant activities. With the Enhanced Op-
erator Function Model with Communications (EOFMC), Bass et al. [4] introduced an
innovative means of representing goal directed behaviors requiring human-human com-
munication and coordination as shared task structures between human operators. If a
task goal is only associated with a given human operator, he or she can have separate,
unshared tasks. This allows the activities associated with a given communication pro-
tocol to be contained in a separate task structure that can be analyzed on its own or
with other modeled tasks. However, neither of the approaches presented in [37] and [4]
have investigated how miscommunications could result in the failure of human-human
communication protocols.
1.1 Objectives
Methods are needed to support formal evaluation of human-human communication
protocols, including potential miscommunications. In this work, we describe a novel
approach that allows an analyst to model human-human communication protocols in
the context of a task analytic modeling formalism and to use formal verification with
model checking to evaluate whether or not the protocol will always ensure that a cor-
rect communication will occur, even with miscommunication. In the following sections,
we describe our method and its implementation. We present EOMFC, the task analytic
modeling formalism we use for modeling protocols; the process that is used to translate
instantiated EOFMCs into the input language of a model checker; and the modification
to the translation process that allows the formal representation to be capable of gener-
ating miscommunications. We also present an air traffic control application to illustrate
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Fig. 1. Human-human communication protocol analysis method
how our method can discover problems with safety critical, human-human communica-
tion protocols. Finally, we discuss our results and outline avenues of future research.
2 Method
The method in Fig. 1 was extended from [11, 15] to allow an analyst to evaluate whether
or not a human-human communication protocol will accomplish its goals for up to
a specified number of miscommunications. An analyst starts by creating a human-
human communication protocol in a task analytic modeling formalism. The result is
run through a translation process which produces a representation of the protocol in
the input language of a model checker. This version of the model includes the maxi-
mum number of miscommunications that the analyst wants in the verification process.
The analyst also creates a specification which asserts desirable properties about the
communication protocol in a formal specification language such as a temporal logic.
Model checking performs formal verification, checking whether the formal model of
the communication protocol adheres to the specification [19]. Model checking produces
a verification report either confirming that the model adheres to the specification or a
counterexample, illustrating how the specification was violated.
2.1 Human-Human Communication Protocol Modeling
To model human-human communication protocols, we use the Enhanced Operator Func-
tion Model with Communications [4] (an extension of the Enhanced Operator Function
Model (EOFM) [9, 10, 18]). EOFMCs, with their formal semantics, are task analytic
modeling formalisms capable of representing multiple human operators and human-
human communication as part of a larger task model. They allow communication pro-
tocols to be modeled as shared task structures on their own or with other tasks.
EOFMC models groups of human operators engaging in shared activities as an in-
put/output system. Inputs may come from the human-device interface, environment,
and/or mission goals. Output variables are human actions. The operators’ task models
describe how human actions may be generated and how the values of local variables
change based on input and local variables (representing perceptual or cognitive pro-
cessing, task behavior, and inner group coordination and communication). All variables
are defined in terms of constants, user defined types, and basic types.
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Tasks in an instantiated EOFMC are represented as a hierarchy of goal directed ac-
tivities and actions. Each task descends from a top level activity (there can be many
tasks in a given instantiated EOFMC). Tasks can either belong to one human operator,
or they can be shared between human operators. A shared task is associated with two
or more associates, and a subset of associates for the general task is identified for each
activity. Thus, it is explicit which human operators are participating in which activity.
Activities can have preconditions, repeat conditions, and completion conditions.
These are represented by Boolean expressions written in terms of input, output, and
local variables as well as constants. They specify what must be true before an activity
can execute (precondition), when it can execute again (repeat condition), and what is
true when it has completed execution (completion condition).
Actions occur at the bottom of the task hierarchy. They can assume several forms:
(a) they can be observable, singular ways the human operator can interact with the envi-
ronment; (b) they can represent a cognitive or perceptual act, where a value is assigned
to a local variable; (c) they can represent human-human communications, where a com-
municator performs a communication action and the information conveyed (which will
have a defined type) is stored in recipient local variables.
A decomposition operator specifies the temporal relationships between and the car-
dinality of the decomposed activities or actions (when they can execute relative to each
other and how many can execute). EOFMC supports ten different decomposition oper-
ators [4]. Herein, only the following are used:
1. and par – all activities or action in the decomposition must execute (in any order)
and their execution can overlap;
2. ord – all activities or actions in the decomposition must execute in order; and
3. com – all of the actions in a decomposition must execute synchronously, where one
human operator must perform a communication action and at least one other human
operator must be the recipient of that communication.
The structure of an instantiated EOFMC can be represented visually as a tree-like graph
(such as Fig. 5 on page 56) where actions are depicted by rectangular nodes and activi-
ties by rounded rectangle nodes. Conditions are connected to the activity they modify:
a precondition is represented by a yellow, downward pointing triangle connected to
the right side of the activity; a completioncondition is presented as a magenta, upward
pointing triangle connected to the left of the activity; and a repeatcondition is conveyed
as a recursive arrow attached to the top of the activity. These standard colors are used
to distinguish condition shapes from each other and other task structures. Decomposi-
tions are arrows, labeled with the decomposition operator, extending below an activity
pointing to a large rounded rectangle with the decomposed activities or actions.
By exploiting the shared activity and communication action feature of EOFMC,
human-human communication protocols can be modeled as shared task activities. Hu-
man communication actions can represent human-human communication. However,
other actions model the way that the human operator interacts with other elements of
the work environment. Thus a human-human communication protocol can represent the
human-human communication procedure and the human operator responses.
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2.2 EOFMC Formal Semantics and Translation
EOFMC has formal semantics which specify how an instantiated EOFMC model ex-
ecutes. Each activity or action has one of three execution states: waiting to execute
(Ready), executing (Executing), and done (Done). An activity or action transitions be-
tween states based on its current state; its start condition (StartCondition – when it can
start executing based on the state of its immediate parent, its parent’s decomposition op-
erator, and the execution state of its siblings); its end condition (EndCondition – when
it can stop executing based on the state of its immediate children in the hierarchy and its
decomposition operators); its reset condition (Reset – when it can revert to Ready based
on the execution state of its parents); and, for an activity, its strategic knowledge (the
Precondition, RepeatCondition, and CompletionCondition). See [18] for more details.
Instantiated EOFMC task models can be translated into the language of the Symbolic
Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [20] (in this case using a java program) using the EOFMC
formal semantics in virtually the same manner as EOFMs [18]. The major difference
between EOFMC and EOFM translation is how communications are handled – how
actions in a com decomposition (not present in EOFM) transition out of the ready state.
In the EOFMC translation, when the StartCondition of a human communication action
is satisfied: all variables representing actions in the associated com decomposition are
set to Done; the variable representing the communication value is set to the value being
communicated; and the local variables human operators use to receive the communica-
tion are set to the communicated value (Fig. 2 shows the SAL notation).
The translated EOFMC can be integrated into a larger system model using a defined
architecture and coordination protocol [12, 18]. Formal verifications are performed us-
ing SAL’s Symbolic Model Checker (SAL-SMC). Any produced counterexamples can









Fig. 2. Pattern of code generated to represent a human-human communication in the SAL
code (see [20]) created from translating an instantiated EOFMC. []StartCondition -->
represents a nondeterministic guarded transition. An apostrophe appended to a variable in-
dicates that the variable’s value in the next state is being assigned and/or referenced. A
com decomposition will contain a human communication action HumanComAction and N lo-
cal variable actions LocalVariableAction1–LocalVariableActionN, where N is a pos-
itive integer. Each action has an associated variable containing a value. ComActionValue
represents the value being communicated by the human communication action and
LocalVariableValue1–LocalVariableValueN represent the values associated with local
variable actions LocalVariableAction1–LocalVariableActionN respectively.
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2.3 Miscommunication Generation
There are many reasons why human-human miscommunication can occur (see [24]).
From an engineering and design perspective, a miscommunication can be viewed as an
“action failure,” where the communicator does not communicate the correct informa-
tion; a ”misperception,” where the recipient of the communication does not correctly
receive the communicated information; or both [43]. To support miscommunication
generation, the translator was modified to include an additional optional transition for
each original communication transition (Fig. 3).
[]StartCondition AND (ComErrorCount < ComErrorMax) -->
HumanComAction’ = Done;
ComActionValue’ IN {x: CommunicationType | TRUE};
LocalVariableAction1’ = Done;
LocalVariable1’ IN {x: CommunicationType | TRUE};
...
LocalVariableActionN’ = Done;
LocalVariableN’ IN {x: CommunicationType | TRUE};
ComErrorCount’ = IF ComActionValue’ <> ComValue
OR LocalVariable1’ <> ComValue
OR ...
OR LocalVariableN’ <> ComValue
THEN ComErrorCount + 1
ELSE ComErrorCount ENDIF;
Fig. 3. Pattern of code generated to represent a human-human miscommunication in the SAL
code created from translating an instantiated EOFMC. Notation is as described in Fig. 2 with
several additions. First, IN is used to indicate that the variable to the left of it can assume any
value in the set to the right. Second, {x: CommunicationType | TRUE} indicates a set con-
taining all the elements defined in type of the communication value (CommunicationType).
Further, ComErrorCount represents the total number of miscommunications that have occurred
and ComErrorMax represents the total number of miscommunications that are allowed to occur.
Finally, the IF ... THEN ... ELSE ... ENDIF statement only allows ComErrorCount to be
incremented if a miscommunication has occurred.
In these transitions, in every case where the communicated value would have nor-
matively been assigned to a variable, the variable can assume any value that can be
communicated through the associated communication action. Thus, not only can the
communicator improperly communicate the information, but each of the recipients can
improperly receive it. Additionally, to give analysts control over the total number of mis-
communications, the method has a constant maximum (ComErrorMax) and a counter
(ComErrorCount) to track the number of miscommunications. The transition ensures
that a miscommunication transition can only occur if maximum has not been reached.
3 Application
To illustrate how our approach can model a safety critical human-human communi-
cation protocol, we construct an instantiated EOFMC model for an aircraft heading
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change in an air transportation example and we use our method to evaluate whether or
not it is robust for up to one miscommunication. This example has three human opera-
tors, two pilots (a pilot flying and a pilot monitoring) and an air traffic controller. In the
scenario, an air traffic controller wants to clear the aircraft to a new heading.
Both the pilots and the air traffic controller have push-to-talk switches which they
press down when they want to verbally communicate information to each other over the
radio. They can release this switch to end communication.
With respect to the aircraft, the Autopilot Flight Director System consists of Flight
Control Computers and the Mode Control Panel (MCP). The MCP provides control
of the Autopilot (A/P), Flight Director, and the Autothrottle System. When the A/P
is engaged, the MCP sends commands to the aircraft pitch and roll servos to operate
the aircraft flight control surfaces. Herein the MCP is used to activate heading changes.
The Heading (HDG)/Tracking (TRK) window of the MCP displays the selected heading
or track (Fig. 4). The 3 digit numeric display provides the current desired heading in
compass degrees (between 0 and 359). Below the HDG window is the heading select
knob. Changes in the heading are achieved by rotating and pulling the knob. Pulling the
knob tells the autopilot to use the pilot selected value and engages the HDG mode.
The following describes a communication protocol designed to ensure that this head-
ing is correctly communicated from the air traffic controller to the two pilots:
1. The air traffic controller contacts the pilots and gives them a new heading clearance.
2. The pilot monitoring re-contacts air traffic control and repeats the heading.
3. If the heading read back to the air traffic controller is not the heading that the air
traffic controller intended, then this process needs to be repeated (starting at step 1)
until the correct heading is read back.
4. Next, the pilot flying goes through the process of entering the new heading.
5. Before engaging the new heading, the pilot monitoring points at the heading win-
dow and reads off the entered heading.
6. If the heading read back by the pilot monitoring does not match the heading that
the pilot monitoring hears from air traffic control, he must then repeat the process
for entering and confirming the heading (going back to step 4).
7. The pilot engages the entered heading.
We next show how we can instantiate this protocol in an EOFMC and use formal veri-









Fig. 4. Heading control and display
Evaluating Human Communication Protocols with Model Checking 55
3.1 Modeling
This communication protocol was implemented as an instantiated EOFMC (Fig. 5).
This model has three human operators: the air traffic controller (ATCo), the pilot flying
(PF), and the pilot monitoring (PM). The entire process starts when the air traffic con-
troller presses his push-to-talk switch. Then, the controller communicates the heading
(lATCoSelectedClearance1) to the pilots (via the hATCoTalk human communication
action), such as “AC1 Heading 070 for spacing.” Both pilots remember this heading
(stored in the local variables lPFHeadingFromATCo and lPMHeadingFromATCo for
the PF and PM respectively). The ATCo releases the switch. Next, the PM presses his
switch. The PM then repeats/communicates the heading that he heard (in this example,
“AC1 Heading 070”), where both the ATCo and PF hear and remember the heading.
The PM releases the switch. This entire process must repeat if the heading the ATCo
hears from the PM does not match the heading he wanted to communicate (lATCSelect-
edClearance = lATCHeadingHeardFromPilots). It completes otherwise.
Once the heading has been communicated, the pilots collaborate to set the new head-
ing (aSetNewHeading). This process involves selecting and confirming the heading
(aChangeAndConfirm) and then executing the new heading (aExecuteTheChange). The
selection and confirmation process starts with the PF pushing and rotating the heading
select knob to the heading heard from the ATCo and then pulling the knob. The PM
verifies that the PF has dialed the correct heading and confirms the heading selection
by pointing to the heading selection in the window and stating the entered heading.
Here, two communications occur in parallel (indicated by the and par decomposition
operator associated with aConfirmTheChange): the PM points at the heading window
(aPointAtHeadingWindow) and he speaks the heading that was entered (aSayTheHead-
ing). Both are perceived by the PF. This process must repeat if the heading the PF
perceived from the ATCo does not match the heading spoken by the PM (lPFHead-
ingFromPM = lPFHeadingFromATCo). Once the heading is confirmed, the PF presses
the heading select (hold) button to execute the heading change.
3.2 Translation
The instantiated EOFMC was translated into SAL using the automated translator. The
original model contained 144 lines of XML code. The translated model contained 404
lines of SAL code. This model was composed with one representing the heading change
window, where the heading can be changed when the pilot rotates the heading knob.
These two model were composed together to create the full system model. The system
model was then used to create two different versions: one where the maximum num-
ber of miscommunications (ComErrorMax) was set to zero and one where it was set
to one.
1 Note that in this example, all headings are modeled abstractly as either being CorrectHeading,
if it matches the heading clearance the ATCo intended to communicate, or IncorrectHeading,
if it does not.







































































































Fig. 5. Visualization of the instantiated EOFMC communication protocol for changing the aircraft
heading. Activities are prefixed by “a”, actions by “h”, inputs by “i”, and local variables by “l”.
Values or variables used in a communication action are bolded.
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3.3 Specification and Verification
The purpose of the communication protocol is to ensure that the pilots set the aircraft
heading to that intended by the air traffic controller. Thus, we can formulate this into







This specification was checked against the two versions of the formal model using
SAL’s symbolic model checker (sal-smc) on a workstation with 16 gigabytes of RAM,
a 3.0 gigahertz dual-core Intel Xeon processor, and the Ubuntu 9.04 desktop.
The first model (ComErrorMax = 0), verified to true in 2.52 seconds (total execution
time) having visited 559 states.2. The second model (ComErrorMax = 1) returned a
counterexample after 3.2 seconds (total execution time) having visited 3726 states.
3.4 Failure Diagnosis
To help diagnose why this failure occurred, the counterexample was visualized using
the technique described in [13]. This revealed the following failure sequence:
– The air traffic controller, wanting to clear the aircraft to a new heading (Correct-
Heading), presses the switch to talk.
– The air traffic controller issues a clearance to CorrectHeading. However, a mis-
communication occurs and the pilot flying thinks he heard IncorrectHeading.
– The air traffic controller releases the switch.
– The pilot monitoring presses his switch to talk.
– The pilot monitoring repeats back the heading he heard from the air traffic con-
troller without a miscommunication occurring.
– The pilot monitoring releases the switch to talk.
– Since the correct heading was heard by the pilot monitoring, the air traffic con-
troller allows the activity for communicating the heading (aCommunicateAndCon-
firmHeading) to complete its execution.
– The pilots begin collaborating to enter the heading from the air traffic controller.
– The pilot flying performs the activity for changing the heading: he presses the head-
ing select knob, sets the dial to the heading he heard from the air traffic controller
(IncorrectHeading), and pulls the heading select knob.
– The pilot monitoring then pointed at the heading display and read off the heading
entered (IncorrectHeading) to the pilot flying.
– Because the heading just heard from the pilot monitoring (lPFHeadingFromPM2)
matches the heading the pilot flying heard from air traffic control (lPFHeadingFro-
mATC), the pilot flying engages the new heading.
Thus, although specifically designed to protect against miscommunication, the pre-
sented communication protocol does in fact allow an incorrect heading to be engaged.
2 Note that an additional verification was conducted using the specification
F(aChangeHeading = Done) to ensure that (1) was not true do to vacuity.
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4 Discussion and Future Work
Human-human communication protocols can be critical to the safe operation of a sys-
tem, and can fail in unexpected ways. Herein, we have introduced a method that allows
human-human communication protocols to be evaluated with model checking. Because
human communications during coordinated activities can include actions for communi-
cating both verbal and non-verbal information and result in non-communication human
actions, this work considers human communication as part of human task behavior.
We used EOFMC to represent communication protocols as shared task behaviors that
include synchronous verbal communications, gestures, activities and low level actions
as well as asynchronous human behaviors associated with the communication. We de-
scribed the EOFMC modeling language, its formal semantics, and the process used
to translate the formal models into a model checking language. We introduced a new
method for automatically generating miscommunications between human operators and
showed how these could be automatically included in the translated representation of
an instantiated EOFMC communication protocol. We also presented an air traffic con-
trol application to demonstrate how this method could be used to find problems in a
human-human communication protocol for a safety critical system.
While the method has shown itself to be successful here, there are still a number of
places for improvement and future development. These are discussed below.
4.1 Design Interventions and Additional Analyses
The failure discovered in the presented human-human communication protocol appears
to occur because the protocol does not give the two pilots a means of reconciling differ-
ences between the headings they heard from air traffic control. Thus, potential solutions
should support both coordinated error detection and recovery. There may be a number
of ways to accomplish this. Two possible approaches are highlighted here. Firstly, if
there is any disagreement between what the two pilots heard from the air traffic con-
troller, then they could consult the air traffic controller to reconcile the disagreement.
However, doing this could add additional work to the already busy air traffic controller
(a potentially undesirable strategy). Alternatively, the pilots could reconcile among each
other to determine what the original air traffic controller’s clearance was. To determine
which of these solutions is most effective, they would need to be encoded into new
human-human communication protocols and evaluated with our presented method. Fu-
ture work should perform these analyses.
Further, the analyses presented here only considered a maximum of one miscom-
munication. Ideally, a human-human communication protocol would be robust to more
than just one. Thus, future work should investigate whether candidate protocols are
robust for ComErrorMax > 1.
4.2 Scalability
The more than six times increase in state space size observed in the model checking of
the model with no miscommunications (ComErrorMax = 0) and the one with up to one
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miscommunication (ComErrorMax = 1) suggests that there could be scalability prob-
lems with the presented method. Further, scalability assessments of formal verification
analyses that have included task analytic models suggest that the state space size can in-
crease exponentially with the size of the task model [16]. These factors could limit what
types of human-human communication protocols our method could be used to evaluate
and/or the maximum number of miscommunications that could be considered in a given
verification. Future work should evaluate how this method scales, identify what factors
most influence its scalability, and determine what types of human-human communica-
tion protocols can be evaluated using it without running into scalability problems.
4.3 Other Modeling Formalisms
SAL was used in this work because EOFM, the base task analytic modeling formalism,
uses SAL. This made it easy to adapt the existing translation tools for use in EOFMC.
However, it is possible that other formal tools could prove to be better suited to this
particular application. For example, Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [26]
natively models communication protocols and thus may be better suited to this work.
Other formal modeling languages and tools could conceivably help address the scala-
bility concerns discussed above. Other formal modeling infrastructures should be con-
sidered in future work.
4.4 Miscommunication Extensions
When generating miscommunications using our method, all of the ways that a miscom-
munication could manifest are considered to be equally probable. However, in reality,
certain miscommunications will be more likely than others [24]. For example, it is much
more likely that a heading clearance will be misheard as a similarly sounding heading
as opposed to one that sounds nothing like the actual heading. Similarly, the target of a
human’s pointing communication would be more likely to be misinterpreted as some-
thing in the target’s periphery rather than something further away. Thus, there could
potentially be a number of miscommunications our method considers that analysts may
not find probable enough to be worth including. Eliminating unlikely miscommunica-
tions could help improve the scalability of the method while improving its utility. Future
work should attempt to extend the method to include this feature.
4.5 Other Erroneous Human Behavior Considerations
Miscommunication is only one type of erroneous human behavior that could impact the
success of the task associated with a human-human communication protocol. For ex-
ample, even when a human operator is aware of how to properly perform a task, failures
of memory, attention, or human coordination can cause him or her to perform actions
or activities incorrectly [7, 28, 40]. Related work has investigated how to generate erro-
neous human behavior in task analytic models and evaluate its impact on systems using
model checking [14, 16]. Thus, it should be possible to evaluate how robust human-
human communication protocols are to these other types of erroneous human behavior.
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Further, the types of erroneous behaviors that have been included in task analytic
models and evaluated formally have almost exclusively focused on the behavior of a
single human operator [6, 14, 16, 23, 36]. Human-human communication protocols can
have each of the human operators doing specific elements of a task on his or her own,
but also requires coordinated behavior between the different human participants. To
date, no work has focused on how to model problems with human-human coordination.
Future work should investigate this subject.
4.6 Comparison to Simulation Models
A number of environments and cognitive architectures exist that allow human behavior
and human-human communication to be evaluated using simulation [5, 27, 31, 33, 39].
Future work should compare our method with these, determine what the tradeoffs are
between them, and investigate possible avenues of synergy.
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